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With the exception of Bohemia,i the land of the Czechs, each “subject race“ of Germany and 
Austria-Hungary forms the “unredeemed” inheritance of a neighbouring State, and its liberation 
is therefore the particular war-aim of that State. But there is no Czech land outside Austria-
Hungary, and the 10,000,000 Czechs and Slovaks inhabiting Bohemia, Moravia, Austrian Silesia 
and Slovakia have nowhere a friend on their borders; they find themselves completely encircled 
by their immemorial enemies, the Germans and Magyars. Prussia, Saxony, Bavaria, and the 
Austrian Duchies surround them on the north, west and south, Magyar lands on the southeast. 
Their only other neighbours, the Austrian Poles, are bound by ties of traditional friendship to the 
Magyars, and for the last forty years have maintained a tacit understanding with the Austrian 
Germans; they have long thrown behind them the Pan-Slav ideas which they embraced for a 
while in 1848, and have never in recent times shown any feeling for their humbler and more 
democratic Slav brethren. Unaided, entirely by its own strength, the Czech nation has survived 
the trials of centuries; and yet by the logic of history the common war-aim of all those who fight 
on the side of the Entente is now closely bound up with the cause of this most isolated of nations. 
The international position of Bohemia after the war will be the truest test of victory. 
The war broke out over an attempt on the part of the Central States to lay down the law to 
Europe on a question in which the interests of other nations were known to be involved. For the 
Germans and Magyars, what was behind it was a problem of power, not of territory. Very soon, 
however, power came to be conceived in terms of territory. German and Magyar dominion was 
to be secured by cessions of land such as would for the future incapacitate their opponents. On 
the other hand, the nations represented by the Entente now naturally bethought themselves of 
their unredeemed lands remaining under German or Magyar rule; claims of nationality, which for 
fear of war had been left dormant for generations or even centuries, sprang to life once war had 
broken out. The original Germanic programme in the war was expansion all round; that of the 
Allied States was the attainment of national unity. 
The events of the next fifteen months, their failures and successes, transformed the 
programme of the Central Powers; a vague principle changed into a clear and definite scheme. 
For years German policy had suffered from a divergence of aims and a dispersion of forces. The 
war and its alliances have produced a concentration of purpose which, unless met with equal 
clearness, is certain to gain for Germany, if not victory, at least the foundations of future success. 
“Mittel-Europa” has become the war- aim of the German, and, in a slightly different form, of the 
Magyar nation also. Germans no longer seriously consider annexations in the West. The vision 
of a great empire in Central Africa has faded into the background, except in the minds of a small 
minority, and allusions to the lost colonies are rare and perfunctory. As regards Russian Poland, 
most Germans would probably be prepared to accept any solution which would leave and 
guarantee to Prussia the possession of her present Polish provinces. But the zeal for “Mittel-
Europa” has only grown greater with the failing of other interests. The old continental dream of -
Napoleon—an overland route into Asia—has become the cardinal issue of the war. Unless the 
very foundations of Central European Imperialism are destroyed, this aim will survive the 
present war and we may see stretching before us the vista of continuous unrest in the future. 
“Mittel-Europa” implies the absolute and undisputed predominance of the German 
element in Austria, and German suzerainty over a Magyarised Hungary, a Coburgised Bulgaria 
and an Enverised Turkey. The aggressive policies of these four nations—Germans, Magyars, 
Bulgars and Turks—have come under a common expert direction, and, wherever they are left a 
chance, will work in accord. All of them are instruments to enable the German master-nation to 
reach a further goal: a secure “sphere of influence” in Asia and Egypt. If this programme had not 
been developed in the middle of a world-war it would inevitably have provoked one. Arising 
firm and clear over the storm of battle, the watchword “Mittel-Europa,” which expresses the 
vision of ages and continents, has transmuted blustering passion into the fixed consciousness of 
an inexorable issue. This fight has now to be carried on beyond the limits known in any previous 
war; for it is truly a struggle for existence. The aims of “Mittel-Europa” are a menace to the 
future of all the Great Powers of the Entente. The Germanised Balkans threaten the British 
Empire in Asia, and Russia’s position in Europe; Russia would be deprived of her only possible 
sea-route to the West should the Straits be bridged by the German land-route to the East. France 
would be excluded from the Eastern Mediterranean; Italy, having lost her influence both in the 
Aegean and the Adriatic, would cease to rank as a Great Power. As for the races of the 
unredeemed lands, their very existence is imperilled by the basic requirements of Central 
European Union; not even the very modest measure of national self-government, such as was 
allowed to them in Austria before the war, will he tolerated anywhere in “Mittel Europa,” once 
they have been an issue in an armed conflict. 
But whilst the German-Magyar scheme thus threatens the fringes of the British Empire, 
France, Italy, Russia and Roumania, it postulates the complete destruction of two nations— the 
Serbs and the Czechs. These must cease altogether to exist as nations if “Mittel-Europa” is to 
arise: for they intervene between the Germans and Magyars, and the Magyars and Bulgars. The 
Serbs stand in the way of the Central European steam-roller. The Czechs are a spoke in its 
wheels, and unless broken up they threaten to paralyse its movements. Bohemia occupies the 
centre of “Mittel-Europa”; it intervenes between its capitals. It extends within less than fifty 
miles of Vienna, Budapest, Leipzig and Breslau, within less than a hundred miles of Berlin and 
Munich. The Czech nation stands there as truly for the discomfiture of the German-Magyar allies, 
as it is not there for their service. 
The national history of Bohemia is filled by one long struggle against the Universal 
German Monarchy under whatever garb it should appear. The Hussite Wars, in the first half of 
the fifteenth century, were as much national as they were religious; they were a revolt against 
German dominion in Bohemia and against the claims of the Holy Roman Empire of the German 
Nation, the ancestor of Pan-German “Mittel-Europa.” The supremacy of the Empire was put to 
the proof, but finally the small, isolated Czech nation had to pay the penalty of its daring. It was 
vanquished. Two centuries went by and once more it took up arms against Catholicism in Church 
and State. In 1618 the Czechs renounced their allegiance to the Hapsburg Emperor, the 
embodiment of the new World Empire, and declared their national independence. It was not after 
all by conquest that they had come under the House of Austria in 1526, but by an agreement, 
ever since disregarded by the Hapsburgs. The Czechs now summoned to their throne a prince 
who was a son-in-law to the King of England, hoping that England, the enemy of Hapsburg 
Spain and Papal Rome, would help those who raised the banner of revolt within the camp of her 
foes. But James I., with an insular aloofness, a pharisaic honesty and a political blindness not yet 
altogether extinct in these islands, was busy studying the constitution of Bohemia, and the rights 
and wrongs of the case, whilst the rebels were succumbing in the desperate, unequal battle on the 
White Mountain. Never has so great a disaster befallen any other civilised nation. Execution and 
banishment swept away its upper classes, its wealth and education. Nothing remained but a 
peasant people as indestructible as the soil, and as passive. 
Again two centuries went by Time, unmeasured by events, was flowing over a dead 
nation. In appearance the Germans had achieved their aim. The very name of the Czech nation 
seemed forgotten. When in the second half of the eighteenth century some Slav-speaking 
inhabitants of Bohemia petitioned the Austrian Emperor, they were described by the picturesque 
term of Originalböhmen. The Germans looked upon them as a kind of half-extinct aborigines. 
Then came the great Czech literary renaissance of the romantic age—the spiritual rebirth of 
Bohemia. By 1848 it had matured into political action, and its first expression was again a protest 
and a revolt against Germany’s Mid-European Imperialism. The German revolutionary 
Parliament at Frankfort, the heir of the Holy Roman Empire, summoned representatives from the 
Bohemian lands. The Czechs refused the invitation, and in order to create a counterbalance to the 
German power convoked in Prague the first Pan-Slav Congress. The Czechs, Poles and Jugo-
Slavs were to unite into a barrier on Germany’s Eastern borders. In Austria, by their joint 
strength they were to break the force of the Pan-Germans and the Magyars, who then were also 
the chief enemies of the Hapsburgs. It was a fine dream, shattered almost as soon as it was 
conceived. It presupposed wisdom and courage in people who had neither—for it was not the 
Hapsburgs only who were deficient in that respect. The Jugo-Slavs alone shared the views of the 
Czechs, but were as yet too weak to be of much assistance.  
What followed for the Czechs, after this failure, was like a nightmare. In spite of the 
extraordinary development of wealth, and the growth of education which put them on a level 
with the most progressive nations of Europe, they were weighed down by the consciousness that 
Bohemia was being buried alive. Her enemies were growing in strength and closing in on her. By 
the Dualist Settlement of 1867 the separation between the Czechs and the Slovaks was made 
absolute and the Slovaks were handed over to the mercies of the Magyars. By the final failure of 
the federalist movement in Austria, the Czechs were forced to enter the Viennese Parliament; 
which for years they had refused to do. They entered it under protest, still asserting the 
inalienable rights of the Bohemian Crown, and sat in it a hopeless minority incapable of making 
their influence tell in any of the great problems of domestic or foreign policy. With the Austro-
German Alliance of 1879—an alliance formed by Germans and Magyars— flood of “Mittel 
Europa” completely encircled Bohemia. With the desperation of drowning men the Czechs 
continued to work for a rapprochement of the Hapsburg Monarchy with Russia and France, and 
against the German Alliance. It was all in vain. At last the thunder of an avalanche broke that 
oppressive-silence which self-complacent cowardice used to call the peace of Europe. The 
creeping glaciers of Mid-Europe were reaching Serbia in their advance, and this at least is for a 
nation the advantage of having a State of its own, be it within the narrowest boundaries, that the 
agonies of its death-struggles break the urbane silence of diplomats and the ignorant indifference 
of more fortunate nations. 
Now at last the problem of “Mittel-Europa” and of its aggrandisement has become for all 
Europe the cardinal political issue. At such a moment can Bohemia be forgotten, or her case 
passed over in silence? When once a free Bohemian land emerges in the heart of Central Europe 
we shall know that the flood of German-Magyar aggression is receding, never to rise again. For 
the Powers which establish Bohemian independence will by that very act be united in the future 
against a possible recrudescence of Ger man Imperialism. There is not a single State among the 
Allies whose interests clash with those of the Czech nation. To all of them the freedom of 
Bohemia will be a safeguard against a new German advance and a barometer of German pressure. 
The desire to remove the Czech wedge which divides “Mittel-Europa’’ will be foremost in any 
revival of the Pan-German dream. But once the independence of Bohemia is established, neither 
Russia, Great Britain nor France can ever concede the smallest abridgment thereof. For in it each 
of these nations will find a principle which it holds sacred: Slav brotherhood, national self-
government and liberty. Cynics may sneer and doubt the strength of principles; yet Serbia and 
Belgium, and the principles embodied in their independence, have given rise to action such as 
mere self-interest could never have produced; and in Russia itself German influences were 
unable to defy the Slav feelings of the nation. Bohemia recreated should never again be 
overwhelmed, and by her very existence will destroy the nightmare of a German Magyar 
hegemony of Europe. 
 
                                                 
i The name of “Bohemia” is here used in its wider meaning to denote all territories inhabited by 
Czechs and Slovaks, i.e., all land in which a majority professes allegiance to the Bohemian 
Crown, the Crown that never touched the brow of Francis Joseph.  He promised to be crowned in 
1871, but never redeemed his promise. 
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